Fair and Sound Secret Sharing from Homomorphic Time-Lock Puzzles by Knapp, Jodie & Quaglia, Elizabeth
Fair and Sound Secret Sharing from
Homomorphic Time-Lock Puzzles
Jodie Knapp and Elizabeth A. Quaglia
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London,
jodie.knapp.2018@rhul.ac.uk, elizabeth.quaglia@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract. Achieving fairness and soundness in non-simultaneous ratio-
nal secret sharing schemes has proved to be challenging. On the one hand,
soundness can be ensured by providing side information related to the
secret as a check, but on the other, this can be used by deviant players to
compromise fairness. To overcome this, the idea of incorporating a time
delay was suggested in the literature: in particular, time-delay encryption
based on memory-bound functions has been put forth as a solution. In
this paper, we propose a different approach to achieve such delay, namely
using homomorphic time-lock puzzles (HTLPs), introduced at CRYPTO
2019, and construct a fair and sound rational secret sharing scheme in
the non-simultaneous setting from HTLPs.
HTLPs are used to embed sub-shares of the secret for a predetermined
time. This allows to restore fairness of the secret reconstruction phase,
despite players having access to information related to the secret which is
required to ensure the soundness of the scheme. Key to our construction
is the fact that the time-lock puzzles are homomorphic so that players
can compactly evaluate sub-shares. Without this efficiency improvement,
players would have to independently solve each puzzle sent from the other
players to obtain a share of the secret, which would be computationally
inefficient. We argue that achieving both fairness and soundness in a non-
simultaneous scheme using a time delay based on CPU-bound functions
rather than memory-bound functions is more cost-effective and realistic
in relation to the implementation of the construction.
1 Introduction
Threshold secret sharing (SS) schemes provide a way to split a secret into shares
such that the secret can be reconstructed by a threshold number of mutually dis-
trustful parties. Knowledge of fewer than the threshold number of shares reveals
nothing about the secret [5,37]. SS schemes are an important primitive used in a
variety of settings from multiparty computation [7,9], to attribute-based encryp-
tion [20,41], and threshold cryptography [4,12]. In a SS scheme, a trusted dealer
splits the secret into shares and distributes one to each authorised party. Parties
then communicate and process their collective shares in a reconstruction phase.
During the communication phase, parties broadcast their shares in one of two
ways: simultaneously or non-simultaneously. That is, with or without synchronic-
ity. Properties of SS schemes are better understood and easier to guarantee in the
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simultaneous setting [10], due to the fact that a non-simultaneous construction
needs to ensure the final party to communicate is still incentivised to follow the
protocol. However, simultaneous schemes are difficult to implement in practice,
therefore attention has recently turned to non-simultaneous communication [2].
Typically, in the non-simultaneous setting [17,25,26], schemes consists of
rounds, where one round of the reconstruction phase simply translates to a
capped period of time in which parties have the opportunity to communicate
their share. Parties learn the secret is reconstructed when they reconstruct some
publicly known value (for example, an indicator), in what is known as a reve-
lation round [29,22]. The previous round to the revelation round is assumed to
be the one in which the secret can be reconstructed from, allowing parties to
identify when they will reconstruct the correct secret.
There is abundant literature for cryptographic [3,4,8,18,22,27,28,29,34,38]
and game-theoretical SS schemes [2,10,17,19,21,30], two somewhat independent
research areas considering honest/malicious parties and rational players, respec-
tively. We refer to Appendix G of [24] for a brief summary of past works. Rational
secret sharing (RSS) was introduced by [21], where they consider the problem
of secret sharing and multiparty computation assuming players prefer to learn
the secret over not learning it, and secondly, prefer that as few as possible other
players learn the secret. While for some applications the cryptographic setting
is appropriate, for other applications of secret sharing it may be more suitable
to view all parties as rational players. RSS is a good approach to capture more
interesting scenarios, such as how to motivate or force players to participate hon-
estly and even how a scheme can penalise players for deviant play. Furthermore,
modelling players as rational is not limited to assuming players always want to
learn the secret above all else. Indeed, as we will explore, an emerging scenario
in RSS considers players that prefer to mislead others above learning the secret.
For these reasons, our attention focuses on RSS schemes.
In RSS schemes, the outcome of the game influences the players’ strategies,
as they seek to maximise their payoff. Security of the game requires the strategies
of players to be in some form of equilibrium which motivates them to honestly
communicate1. Achieving an equilibrium between players’ strategies is the most
natural way to demonstrate a fundamental property of SS schemes, called fair-
ness [14,23].
A fair scheme ensures that if a player deviates, the probability that they can
recover the shared secret over honest players is negligible. That is, a player is
at no advantage in learning the secret if they withhold or dishonestly send a
share. In the simultaneous setting, [19,21] both achieve fairness using some form
of publicly known indicator and by demonstrating that their protocol is in a
form of Nash equilibrium [33]. In the non-simultaneous setting, however, a basic
threat to fairness arises: in a (t, n) threshold RSS scheme, the last player out of
t can decide not to communicate their share and use all the other players’ shares
to reconstruct the secret, leaving the (t− 1) honest players with an insufficient
1 See Appendices D.1, and D.2 for further discussion on payoff functions and equilib-
rium concepts.
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number of shares to do so. The rational behaviour of all parties would therefore
be to withhold their share. In works such as [17,26,30], fairness can be achieved
similarly to the simultaneous setting, whereby players can recognise the reve-
lation round using (or reconstructing) some form of public indicator. However,
this only works under the assumption that players prefer everyone to obtain the
correct output over misleading others [2,10]. If this assumption does not hold,
an alternative way of providing fairness needs to be used, as another property
of SS schemes is no longer ensured, soundness.
In RSS schemes, soundness [2,10] ensures players never reconstruct an incor-
rect secret except with negligible probability. In other words, honest players are
guaranteed to output a correct value, or a special abort symbol ⊥ [2]. Soundness
is becoming of emerging relevance in the non-simultaneous setting, assuming
rational players obtain a greater payoff from misleading other players compared
to learning the secret. Soundness has been achieved in prior work [10] focusing
on non-simultaneous communication as follows: before reconstruction begins, all
players are given protocol-induced side information alongside their list of shares.
They must assume that when a player aborts communication, the previous round
was the revelation round. Even if a deviant player has aborted early, using this
side information, honest players can check that they have the correct value after
reconstruction. If not, they terminate the reconstruction altogether.
However, achieving soundness this way compromises fairness, as a deviant
player can use the side-information to check whether they can abort early and
learn the secret before honest players. The authors of [30] were the first to pro-
pose a fair RSS scheme that can tolerate arbitrary side-information, by propos-
ing the use of time-delay encryption (TDE) [6,32]. The basic idea of a TDE
scheme is to encrypt a message such that it can only be decrypted after a spe-
cific amount of time has elapsed. The scheme in [30] employs a cryptographic
memory-bound function2 (CMBF) [1,16] as a way to achieve time-delay in the
recovery of an encrypted sub-share of the secret. The fairness of their scheme is
restored by setting the runtime of rounds of the secret sharing scheme to be less
than the time it takes to decrypt the encrypted shares. Thus, there is no way
for a deviant player to learn anything about the secret during a reconstruction
round before they must decide whether to abort communication. In addition, a
proof of the sender’s work in computing their message is sent. The scheme pro-
posed in [10] builds upon [30], by encrypting shares (shares are computed using
Shamir’s SS scheme) using the CMBF and further splits the encrypted shares
into sub-shares, distributed to players. During processing, players independently
evaluate the encrypted sub-shares to obtain the encrypted share, decrypt and
then reconstruct the polynomial to obtain the secret. They use a specific form
of side-information, called a checking share, which is an actual share of the se-
cret that players can use to confirm they have reconstructed the correct secret,
2 A CMBF is a family of deterministic algorithms such that an efficiently generated
key can decrypt the encrypted input, with a lower-bound on the number of memory-
access steps to do so.
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thus achieving soundness.3 We note that the memory-bound running times of
employing the MBF in [16], a cryptographic version of which is used for time-
delay in [10,30], endows a high cost on the players who have to verify the proof
of work from messages received by other players. In addition, the players send-
ing the message can potentially perform less work than what is stated in their
accompanying proof [15,36]. These drawbacks suggest that a better time-delay
mechanism should be explored to guarantee fairness, that reduces verification
costs of the communicated messages and\or increases computational efficiency
for honest players obtaining the secret shares after the delay.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we improve on [10] and propose a RSS scheme achieving fairness
and soundness in the non-simultaneous communication setting from a CPU-
bound function, as opposed to a CMBF, namely a homomorphic time-lock puzzle.
Informally, a time-lock puzzle (TLP) [35] embeds a secret into a puzzle such
that it cannot be decrypted until a certain amount of time T has elapsed. Char-
acteristics of a TLP include fast puzzle generation and security against parallel
algorithms, assuming the sequentiality of the underlying mathematical problem
[35]. A homomorphic time-lock puzzle (HTLP) scheme evaluates puzzles ho-
momorphically using some operation, without the evaluator knowing the secret
shares encapsulated within the corresponding puzzles. The resulting puzzle out-
put contains the homomorphic evaluation of the input puzzles, enabling a more
efficient way for decryptors to obtain the final output solution, as they can solve
just one puzzle rather than solving all of the puzzles individually with standard
TLPs, and then evaluating a final solution.
In our scheme, the dealer splits the secret into shares and creates an addi-
tional share which is broadcast to all players, i.e., the checking share. The rest
of the shares are split into sub-shares, embedded into HTLPs and distributed
to the corresponding players in such a way that the HTLP scheme can recon-
struct the share from them. Intuitively, the checking share is used to verify the
soundness of the secret that players reconstruct, and the delay provided by the
HTLP scheme is used to guarantee fairness in the presence of a checking share for
players communicating non-simultaneously. More specifically, the HTLP scheme
embeds the sub-shares into puzzles that cannot be decrypted before a round of
communication in the reconstruction phase has finished. Fairness is achieved by
setting each round of communication to have an upper time bound of T . Thus, a
player wishing to deviate from their prescribed strategy and quit communication
will not be able to derive the secret before the end of the round, in which case,
the other players realise the deviant player has quit and output the result of the
previous rounds reconstruction. We show that even if a player quits in a round
and manages to learn the secret, the only case in which they can do so results
3 Note that [30] works under the assumption that players prefer everyone to obtain
the correct output over misleading others, therefore soundness is not an issue that
needs to be addressed.
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in the honest players also learning the secret. Therefore there is no advantage in
a player deviating from their prescribed strategy.
From our generic construction, which we show satisfies soundness and fair-
ness, we provide a concrete instantiation using the multiplicative variant of the
HTLP scheme proposed in [31]. The result is a concrete, efficient scheme whose
security relies on standard assumptions.
We argue that our improvement on prior work is threefold: we base the time
delay of the construction on CPU-bound functions, as opposed to CMBFs; we
provide an efficiency gain by using HTLPs instead of TLPs, and our solution
has inherent flexibility.
Basing the time-delay primitive on CPU-bound functions as opposed to
memory-bound functions captures a more realistic, inexpensive way to imple-
ment a SS scheme construction. Processors are faster than memory and scale
better; even more so, fast memory is considerably more expensive. In practice,
it is easier to raise the computational requirements of a player than it is mem-
ory accesses, up to a point, as adding more processors to a computer is more
accessible than making memory accesses faster. A justification for using MBFs
in [10,30] is that disparities in the computational power of players can cause
unfairness when using standard TLPs for time-delay. However, with reasonable
assumptions on the CPU-power of players, this disparity is not significant.
Furthermore, we use a HTLP for time-delay, which requires less compu-
tational work on behalf of the players decrypting puzzles compared to using
standard TLPs. This efficiency improvement means that the consequence of dis-
parities in CPU-power becomes less significant. To see this, evaluating several
puzzles homomorphically, and then solving just one puzzle, requires fewer com-
putational steps than solving individual puzzles and evaluating a function over
the outputs, as in [10].
Finally, the instantiation of our generic scheme can use any correct SS scheme
with a suitable HTLP, dependent on the application. The HTLPs that we use,
from [31], are adaptable in the following ways: different operators (linear, mul-
tiplicative, and XOR) can be used, we can augment the setup with puzzles of
different time hardness parameters (T1, . . . , Tn) or have a reusable setup, in which
the scheme remains efficiently computable.
We refer the reader to the full version of this paper [24] for the formal security
analysis of our generic scheme and concrete instantiation using multiplicative-
homomorphic TLPs and a multiplicative SS scheme. For the remainder of this
paper, any reference to appendices is in relation to the full version of our paper.
2 Definitions and Modelling
2.1 Secret Sharing
Informally, a (t, n) secret sharing scheme (SS) involves a dealer D, some secret
s, and a set P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} of n players. The dealer distributes shares of
a secret s chosen according to an efficiently samplable distribution of the set of
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secrets, labelled S = {Sλ}λ∈N, with security parameter λ. The key idea behind
threshold SS is that no subset t′ < t of players in P can learn the secret s,
including an adversary controlling t′ players. Conversely, every subset t′ ≥ t of
players in P is capable of reconstructing s.
A SS protocol is composed of two phases, share and reconstruction. During
the share phase, the dealer samples a secret s from Sλ and generates n shares
from the secret being distributed to each player in P . The dealer does this
non-interactively, using a share algorithm to generate the set of shares to be
distributed. The dealer digitally signs (typically using information-theoretically
secure MACs) and encrypts the shares before distributing them to individual
players over a broadcast channel 4.
The reconstruction phase itself is composed of two parts: communication and
processing. The communication phase has players interact by sending their share
over the broadcast channel to every other player in P (if a broadcast channel
is not available to parties, then they have to send their share to each of the
other players separately). Once players have communicated, they can move to
the processing phase where they embark on reconstructing the secret s from the
shares that they have received. This is under the assumption that a sufficient
number of shares have been sent and received from other players, and that players
followed the protocol (correctness). If an insufficient amount of shares have been
received, the secret cannot be reconstructed, so players output ⊥. Any player
taking part in reconstruction proceeds to output their result.
Threshold secret sharing schemes have been explored extensively, and were
introduced independently by Shamir [37] and Blakley [5]: Shamir’s scheme is
based on polynomial interpolation over a finite field of prime order, and Blak-
ley’s scheme is based on the uniqueness of hyperplane intersection. Extending
the work of [37], [11,13,40] propose multiplicative homomorphic secret sharing
schemes based on polynomial interpolation over finite groups with respect to
multiplication, that need not be of prime order (See Appendix B [24]).
Next, we recall the formal definition of a threshold secret sharing scheme,
with the implicit assumption that the dealer has digitally signed the shares
before distributing:
Definition 1 ((t, n) Secret Sharing). Given a dealer D, a secret s ∈ Sλ for
security parameter λ, and a set of n authorised players P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, a (t, n)
secret sharing scheme is a tuple of three PPT algorithms (Setup,Share,Recon)
defined as follows:
- Share Phase: D takes as input the secret s and performs the following steps
non-interactively:
1. pp ← Setup(1λ) a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input security
parameter 1λ and outputs public parameters pp, which are broadcast to
all players in P .
4 Privacy and authentication of the distribution of shares is a standard cryptographic
assumption in secret sharing schemes [34].
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2. {s1, . . . , sn} ← Share(pp, s) a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input
the secret s ∈ Sλ and outputs n shares si, one for each player in P .
3. Distribute si to player Pi for every i ∈ [n] over a secret, authenticated
channel.
- Reconstruction Phase: Any player in P = {P1, . . . , Pn} is able to take
part in this phase.
1. Communication:
(a) Each player Pi sends their share si over a secure broadcast channel
to all other players in P .
(b) Pi checks that they have received (t− 1) or more shares. If so, they
proceed to processing.5
2. Processing:
Once Pi has a set of t
′ shares labelled S′, they independently do the
following:
(a) {s,⊥} ← Recon(pp, S′) a deterministic algorithm that takes as input
the set S′ of t′ shares and outputs the secret s if t′ ≥ t or outputs
abort ⊥ otherwise.
A (t, n) threshold SS scheme needs to satisfy the properties of correctness and
secrecy, whose definitions are provided in [24], Appendix A.3. Informally, cor-
rectness means that an honest execution of the scheme results in the true secret
being output, except with negligible probability; and secrecy ensures that re-
construction with fewer shares than the threshold (t) results in abort (⊥) being
output, except with negligible probability.
2.2 Rational Secret Sharing
Using game-theory notions, players are considered to be rational if they have a
preference in the outcome of the reconstruction phase. In a rational secret sharing
(RSS) scheme, a players strategy is to maximise their payoff from the outcome
of the game. The strategy σi taken by each player Pi must be determined by
the dealer in order to achieve a fair outcome. Observe that depending on the
scheme, the strategies of players in P may be the same or different.
In Definition 1, players only participate in the reconstruction phase. There-
fore, we define a RSS scheme by providing a definition of the reconstruction
phase only.
Definition 2 ((t, n) Rational Secret Reconstruction [10]). A reconstruc-
tion phase Γt,n is defined by Γt,n = (Γ,
−→σ ) where Γ is the game to be played
by players during the reconstruction phase and −→σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) denotes the
strategy profile of the players in P prescribed by the dealer D during the share
phase for that scheme.
The outcome of the phase for all players is defined by the n-dimensional
vector
5 Whilst not explicit in the definition, there is an upper bound on how long players
can communicate their shares for. Therefore, at the end of their communication, if
a player Pi has not obtained a sufficient number of shares, then they output ⊥ at
the end of the reconstruction phase.
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−→ω ((Γ,−→σ )t,n) = (ω1, . . . , ωn)
where ωi refers to the outcome of the phase for player Pi.
The outcome ωi alludes to whether player Pi learns the entirety of s, nothing
of s, is mislead into learning a fake secret s′ or aborts the reconstruction phase
altogether (⊥). It is important to note that the outcome of the phase depends
on the strategy of the player.
One of the fundamental properties of secret sharing is fairness [39], which guar-
antees that no player has an advantage in the protocol over other players. The
following defines fairness in the context of a RSS scheme. We use the following
notation for a deviating strategy σ′i for player Pi, to signify when a player be-
haves in a different way to how they are meant to. That is, they do not follow
the protocol. In addition, P−i represents all players in P excluding player Pi,
and σ−i signifies the honest strategies of this set of (n− 1) players, P−i.
Definition 3 (Fairness [10]). The reconstruction phase Γt,n is
completely fair if for every arbitrary alternative strategy σ′i followed by player Pi
for some i ∈ [n], there exists a negligible function µ in the security parameter λ
such that the following holds:
Pr[ωi(Γ, (σ
′
i, σ−i)) = s] ≤ Pr[ω−i(Γ, (σ′i, σ−i)) = s] + µ(λ).
That is, the probability of player Pi learning the secret when they deviate from
their prescribed strategy in phase Γt,n (but all other players follow their pre-
scribed strategies) is only ever negligibly more than the probability of the other
players learning the secret too. Consequently, such a player has no real advantage
in deviating from their strategy.
How do we ensure that players (despite any preferences they may have) are
motivated to follow a strategy in the non-simultaneous setting? This is typically
done by assuming that the strategies of players are in a computationally strict
Nash equilibrium (or some other variant of a Nash equilibrium) [14,23,33]. This
concept makes certain that if every player Pi ∈ P believes all other players in
P are following their prescribed strategy in the phase, then they have nothing
to gain in deviating from their own strategy and are penalised in some way
by deviating. In our construction, we need to ensure players strategies are in a
computationally strict Nash equilibrium when they additionally have access to
side-information related to the secret. We discuss this further in Appendix D.2
of the full version of this paper [24].
Another fundamental property of RSS is soundness. Simply put, soundness of
the reconstruction phase output means that the probability of players following
the scheme outputting an incorrect secret when another player deviates from
their own strategy is negligible.
Definition 4 (Soundness [10]). Reconstruction phase Γt,n is sound if for
every arbitrary alternative strategy σ′i followed by player Pi for i ∈ [n], there
exists a negligible function µ in the security parameter λ such that the following
holds:
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Pr[ω−i(Γ, (σ
′
i, σ−i)) 6∈ {s,⊥}] ≤ µ(λ)
In our construction, as we shall see, we achieve this property by using a check-
ing share, similarly to [10]. A checking share is an actual share of the secret,
kept separate from the other shares and publicly broadcast to players. In order
to formalise our scheme, discussed in Section 3, we recall the definition of a
homomorphic time-lock puzzle (HTLP) [31], on which our construction relies.
2.3 Homomorphic TLPs
Informally, a time-lock puzzle (TLP) scheme embeds a secret into a puzzle such
that it cannot be decrypted until a certain amount of time T has elapsed. The
seminal work of [35] outlined the characteristics of a TLP:
– Fast puzzle generation: namely, the time t required to generate a puzzle Z
must be t << T , for a given (time) hardness parameter T .
– Security against parallel algorithms: that is, the encapsulated secret s is
disguised within the puzzle Z for circuits of depth < T , regardless of the
size of the circuit.
However, when the decryptor is faced with a significant number of puzzles to
solve, a standard TLP scheme requires the decryptor to solve each individual
puzzle, which could be very inefficient. Driven by this limitation [31] introduced
the notion of a homomorphic TLP (HTLP), a scheme that compactly evaluates
puzzles homomorphically.
Homomorphic time-lock puzzles are augmented TLPs allowing anyone to
evaluate a circuit C over sets of puzzles (Z1, . . . ,Zn) homomorphically using op-
eration Ψ 6, without the evaluator necessarily knowing the secret values (s1, . . . , sn)
encapsulated within the corresponding puzzles. The resulting output (a puzzle
Z) contains the circuit output C(s1, . . . , sn), and the hardness parameter T
does not depend on the size of the circuit C that was evaluated (this is called
compactness).
Definition 5 (HTLP [31]). Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a class of circuits and let
secret space Sλ be a finite domain for security parameter λ. A homomorphic
time-lock puzzle (HTLP) with respect to C and Sλ is defined by a tuple of four
PPT algorithms (HP.Setup,HP.Gen,HP.Solve,HP.Eval) as follows:
– pp ← HP.Setup(1λ, T ) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input secu-
rity parameter 1λ and hardness parameter T and outputs public parameters
pp.
– Z ← HP.Gen(pp, s) a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the public
parameters pp and a secret s ∈ Sλ and outputs a puzzle Z.
– s ← HP.Solve(pp,Z) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input public
parameters pp and puzzle Z, and outputs a solution s.
6 What Ψ is depends on the application the HTLP is being used for. It could be
addition, multiplication or XOR for example.
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– Z̃ ← HP.Eval(pp, C, Ψ,Z1, . . . ,Zn) is a probabilistic algorithm taking as in-
put a circuit C ∈ Cλ, parameters pp, homomorphic-operation Ψ , and a set
of n puzzles (Z1, . . . ,Zn), and outputs a master puzzle Z̃.
A HTLP scheme should satisfy correctness, security, and compactness. Infor-
mally, correctness means that if a scheme is executed properly, then the proba-
bility of the output being anything other than the solution is negligible. Captured
within the definition of the correctness of a HTLP scheme [31] is the time-delay
in solving a HTLP puzzle. Informally, given a puzzle evaluated in the scheme,
there exists a fixed polynomial over the security and time hardness parameters
which bounds the runtime solving the puzzle in the HTLP scheme.
Intuitively, a scheme is considered secure if the output of execution is in-
distinguishable from random to an eavesdropping adversary. Compactness is a
non-trivial property requiring that the complexity of decrypting an evaluated
ciphertext does not depend on the function used to evaluate the ciphertext. In-
tuitively, it means that the ciphertext size should not grow through homomorphic
operations and the output length of the homomorphically evaluated ciphertext
only depends on the security parameter. In the context of a HTLP, compactness
therefore requires the size of the evaluated puzzle ciphertexts to be independent
of the size of the circuit, and for the runtime of the evaluation algorithm to be
independent of the hardness parameter T .
3 A Fair and Sound Non-Simultaneous Rational Secret
Sharing Scheme
We consider a RSS scheme with the reconstruction phase defined as in Definition
2. In our construction, the dealer runs the share phase, where they sample a value
for the number of shares needed to reconstruct the secret, as well as splitting the
secret into shares and further into sub-shares, similarly to the approach in [10].
Then, the dealer distributes a unique, ordered list of sub-shares to each player,
alongside broadcasting public parameters.
The reconstruction phase works in rounds, with the n players in P performing
the communication phase and processing phase in parallel. In the first round of
the reconstruction phase, only the communication phase occurs. The processing
phase does not start until the second round onwards. Each round (after the first)
of the reconstruction phase works as follows. Players communicate (following the
order of their given list) the sub-share corresponding to the round of Γ that they
are in, one at a time. They must check at the end of the round that they have
obtained sub-shares from all other players.
At the same time, players process the sub-shares received in the previous
round, evaluating them over some function to obtain a share of the secret. After
a certain number of rounds, as decided by the dealer, a sufficient number of
shares will have been derived and players can use these shares to reconstruct
the correct secret. The concept of rounds in RSS means that players gradually
recover the secret, by reconstructing just one share per round, motivating all
players to continue following the reconstruction phase.
Fair and Sound Secret Sharing from Homomorphic Time-Lock Puzzles 11
More specifically, we let the dealer D be honest and non-interactive, only tak-
ing part in the share phase. Following [25], we assume that the dealer (information-
theoretically) authenticates the shares distributed to players so that a player
cannot send an incorrect share to another player, and the set of shares that a
player sends to other players is unique. These assumptions translate to only one
of two actions that a player can perform in each round: communicate (follow
their strategy) or remain silent. We assume the players’ strategies in the recon-
struction phase are in a (computationally) strict Nash equilibrium in order to
motivate them to follow the phase and not deviate.
In the share phase of our construction, D samples r, the revelation value.
The revelation value signifies how many correctly run rounds, or equivalently,
how many recovered shares are sufficient for a player to reconstruct the secret.
D determines r by randomly sampling from an efficiently samplable discrete
distribution G, keeping the value secret from all players. Next, D obtains the
first (r + 1) shares of the secret s; where the 0th share s0 will be the checking
share and is kept separate and broadcast to all players before the reconstruction
phase. We note that the checking share is only used to verify the output of the
reconstruction phase, and cannot be used to reconstruct the secret itself. This
is necessary in order to ensure the soundness of the output.
Additionally, the dealer randomly samples a value d from an efficiently sam-
plable discrete distribution G′ and generates d fake shares, used to disguise the
value r. Typically both G and G′ are geometric distributions [18,10] (see Ap-
pendix C of [24]). Letting m = r+ d, the dealer proceeds to create n sub-shares
for each of the m shares, so that each player has a sub-share of every share, for
a total of m sub-shares in each of the n lists, one for each player.
Similarly to [30], we need the sub-shares to be encrypted before being dis-
tributed to a player in a way that no player can decrypt their sub-shares before
a round of communication is over. This is done so that players communicating
non-simultaneously do not know until after they have broadcast their share for
a given round, whether or not that was the revelation round. This is crucial to
achieve fairness and ensure that players continue to be motivated to follow the
scheme [21].
Our construction achieves this time delay using homomorphic time-lock puz-
zles (HTLPs), first introduced in [31] (see Definition 5). Using a HTLP scheme
with hardness parameter T , the dealer sets the time limit for each round of com-
munication to be bounded above by time T . Encrypting the sub-shares creates
so-called sub-puzzles7 of the sub-shares, which the dealer distributes as a list to
individual players before reconstruction begins.
Each round of the reconstruction phase Γr,r+1 has players communicate non-
simultaneously the corresponding sub-puzzle from their list, whilst processing
in parallel the sub-puzzles received from the previous round. In a round of the
7 We call the HTLP encryption of the sub-shares sub-puzzles for ease of understanding.
They are simply time-lock puzzles that can be homomorphically evaluated to obtain
a puzzle of the share which corresponds to the homomorphic evaluation of the given
sub-shares.
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communication phase, players must send their sub-share before time T . Once
this time has elapsed, a player checks that they have received (n−1) sub-puzzles
from the other players. In this case, in the next round of the reconstruction phase,
these n sub-puzzles will be processed.
In the processing phase, players work independently and evaluate the n sub-
puzzles from the previous round. In doing so, they will obtain a puzzle of the
share for the previous round. This is computationally correct given that the sub-
shares were derived by the dealer such that over some function the sub-shares
homomorphically compute this share. The puzzle of the share is decrypted using
the solve algorithm in the HTLP scheme to obtain the corresponding share.
Players attempt to reconstruct the actual secret from the shares that they
have reconstructed so far. They determine whether they have reached the rev-
elation round by using the checking share s0 to confirm whether their solution
is the real secret. If so, players output the secret s. If the reconstructed value as
determined by the checking share, is s′ 6= s, the players do not output a result.
Instead, they will start the subsequent reconstruction phase round. Players re-
peat this cycle of steps until they have reconstructed the correct secret s unless
either of the following scenarios occurs:
1. A deviant player has quit communicating in a round of the phase. Even if
they correctly guess the right round to quit (round r), the time delay of the
encrypted sub-puzzles ensures that the deviant player cannot decrypt the
evaluated puzzle of the share before the end of a round.
The non-deviant players quit communicating if at the end of the round they
have received fewer than (n− 1) sub-puzzles. As a consequence, they cannot
reconstruct a puzzle share for that round and will have an insufficient number
of reconstructed shares, so the outcome for reconstruction will be ⊥. The
act of aborting means that no player learns the secret including the deviant
player, as they are identified as a cheater before they can reconstruct the
secret, if at all.
2. Players have sent the final, mth sub-puzzle from their list and so have no
more sub-puzzles to share after this round. Players quit communication and
attempt to reconstruct the secret from the shares that were reconstructed in
the previous rounds.
3.1 Our Construction
Given an honest, non-interactive dealer D and a set of n rational players P =
{P1, . . . , Pn} communicating non-simultaneously, we use a HTLP to build a fair
RSS scheme with sound output. Assume that each round of the reconstruction
phase is bounded by the time hardness parameter T .
Definition 6 (Non-Simultaneous RSS Scheme).
Given security parameter λ, time hardness parameter T , an efficiently samplable
distribution of the set of secrets Sλ with operator Ψ , secret s ∈ Sλ, efficiently
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samplable discrete distributions G,G′, we construct a RSS scheme with recon-
struction phase in the non-simultaneous setting as a tuple of three PPT algo-
rithms (Setup′,Share′,Recon′) from a secret sharing scheme (Setup,Share,Recon)
and a HTLP scheme
(HP.Setup,HP.Gen,HP.Solve,HP.Eval) as follows:
– Sharing Phase: The honest dealer D takes as input the secret s ∈ Sλ and
performs the following steps non-interactively:
1. pp′ ← Setup′(1λ, T ) a probabilistic algorithm on inputs 1λ, T in which
the dealer runs:
(a) pp1 ← HP.Setup(1λ, T ) which outputs public parameters pp1.
(b) pp2 ← Setup(1λ, T ) which outputs the public parameters pp2. Addi-
tionally let for r ←$ G be the sampled revelation value and d be a
random value d←$ G′.
Outputs are sampled values r, d and public parameters pp′ := {pp1, pp2}.
2. {s0, {list1, . . . , listn}} ← Share′(pp′, s): a probabilistic algorithm that
takes as input the secret s ∈ Sλ and public parameters pp′. The output
consists of a checking share s0 and lists labelled listj for j ∈ [n], each
composed of m sub-puzzles for m = r + d.
(a) Run {s0, {s1, . . . , sr}} ← Share(pp2, s) a probabilistic algorithm with
inputs the public parameters pp2 and secret s ∈ Sλ. The outputs are
(r + 1) shares of the secret; the checking share s0 and si for i ∈ [r].
(b) {sr+1, . . . , sm} ←$ Sλ, randomly sample d fake shares from Sλ.
(c) For every i ∈ [m], compute the list of sub-shares {si,1, . . . , si,n} such
that si = Ψ
j∈[n]
si,j .
(d) Run Zi,j ← HP.Gen(pp1, si,j) a probabilistic algorithm that takes as
input sub-shares si,j and public parameters pp1, and outputs sub-
puzzles Zi,j , ∀i ∈ [m],∀j ∈ [n].
(e) D distributes listj = {Z1,j , · · · ,Zr,j ,Zr+1,j , · · · ,Zm,j} to the corre-
sponding player Pj , for every j ∈ [n].
3. The dealer distributes the following:
(a) D broadcasts {pp′, s0} to all P the public parameters pp′ and check-
ing share s0.
(b) D distributes listj to Pj for every j ∈ [n].
– Reconstruction Phase: All players in P = {P1, . . . , Pn} independently
take part in this phase.
1. Communication: We are in the kth round of the communication, for some
1 < k ≤ m.
(a) Pj sends to all of P the sub-puzzle Zk,j for every j ∈ [n] non-
simultaneously.
(b) At the end of round k (after time T has elapsed), along with their
own sub-puzzle, player Pj should have received {Zk,1, . . . ,Zk,n} from
all of P .
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(c) Move to round (k+ 1) of communication and round k of processing,
unless fewer than (n−1) sub-puzzles have been received. In this case,
proceed to abort communication and move to 2c with reconstructed
shares {s1, . . . , sk−1}.
2. Processing: We are in round (k− 1) of processing, for some 1 < k ≤ m.8
For any j ∈ [n], Pj does the following:
(a) Zk−1 ← HP.Eval(pp1, T , Ψ,Zk−1,1, · · · ,Zk−1,n): Run the probabilis-
tic algorithm HP.Eval with inputs the public parameters pp1, hard-
ness parameter T , and the list of n sub-puzzles for the (k − 1)th
round, a player homomorphically evaluates sub-puzzles with opera-
tor Ψ to output share puzzle Zk−1.
(b) sk−1 ← HP.Solve(pp1, T ,Zk−1): Run the probabilistic algorithm
HP.Solve that takes as input the public parameters pp1; hardness
parameter T ; and puzzle share Zk−1 and outputs secret share sk−1.
Output the round share sk−1 and move to reconstructing s.
(c) {s,⊥} ← Recon′(pp′, s0, {s1, . . . , sk−1}): where the players run
{s,⊥} ← Recon(pp2, {s1, . . . , sm}), a deterministic algorithm that
inputs public parameters pp2 and (k−1) reconstructed shares of the
secret {s1, . . . , sk−1}. Player Pj uses checking share s0 to confirm the
soundness of their reconstructed value and outputs either the correct
secret s or abort ⊥.
(d) If Pj outputs ⊥, but no player quit in round k of communication
and every player Pj ∈ P has listj 6= ∅, then players go to (k + 1)th
round of reconstruction phase. If either case holds, output ⊥.
We have the following result.
Theorem 1. Our non-simultaneous rational secret scheme (Setup′,Share′,Recon′)
satisfies correctness, fairness and soundness in the presence of side information
related to the secret, assuming the following properties:
– correctness, security, and compactness of the HTLP scheme,
– correctness and secrecy of the SS scheme,
– the checking share side information is correct, protocol-induced auxiliary in-
formation.
We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix F of [24], demonstrating that our construction
satisfies correctness, achieves soundness in the non-simultaneous setting using
protocol-induced side information, and achieves fairness despite the presence of
this side-information by using a HTLP to provide a time-delay to the scheme.
More specifically, in our security analysis, we summarise the scenarios in
which a deviant player attempts to mislead. In particular, we demonstrate that
if a player aborts in a round k with respect to revelation round r, regardless
of the round that k is, the outcome for all players is the same. Analysing the
scenarios in which a players quits communicating aids the proofs of fairness
8 At least one round of communication is required before players can start processing.
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and correctness, by providing an intuition to the outcome of the reconstruction
phase.
Fairness of the scheme is proven as follows: we show that Definition 3 is
satisfied in our construction assuming the correctness and security of the HTLP
scheme [31] (definitions of which are provided in [24], Appendix A.2), which is
employed to implement a time-delay in the scheme. We use a reduction to break
the correctness and security of the HTLP scheme, contradicting our assumptions,
in order to show that there does not exist a deviant player with the ability to
decrypt a puzzle in time less than T . Furthermore, assuming the correctness and
secrecy of the underlying SS scheme (see Appendix A.3 [24]), we show that the
probability of a deviant player learning the secret, whilst other players do not,
is negligible in the security parameter λ. Observe that we additionally show in
[24] that the rational players strategies −→σ are in a computationally strict Nash
equilibrium (Appendix D.2, Definition 16 [24]) following the proofs of [10,30].
In order to prove soundness, we provide an Appendix E preceding the analysis
of Theorem 1 in the full version of our paper [24], to define the side information
used to achieve soundness. We closely follow the proof of [10] by firstly defining a
membership oracle. Informally, this is an oracle queried by players in reconstruc-
tion in order to check the soundness of their reconstructed value [30]. Following
[10], we claim and prove that the checking share in our construction can be used
in place of a sound membership oracle (see Definition 18, Appendix E [24]), as a
specific form of protocol-induced side information to ensure soundness. Finally,
we prove that our generic construction achieves soundness with a checking share
(found in Appendix F, Theorem 2 of[24]).
We defer the reader to [24], Appendix F for the full details of our proofs.
Next, we highlight the efficiency improvements our construction achieves by
using a HTLP over standard TLPs. We then discuss how our results improve
upon the scheme of [10], the most relevant related work.
HTLPs vs. TLPs The homomorphic property of a HTLP scheme means that
solving a puzzle, the most computationally expensive step for the players, need
only be run once rather than n times in the processing phase of our scheme. The
computational cost of running HP.Solve is Ω(2T )-steps 9.
Indeed, if we were to use a standard TLP in the processing phase of our
scheme, each player would independently have to solve each of the n sub-puzzles
using P.Solve, and then evaluate the n sub-shares to obtain the share for that
round. Conversely, by using a HTLP in our scheme, players must run HP.Eval
once over the n sub-puzzles, outputting a master puzzle, and proceed to run
HP.Solve once on this master puzzle to obtain the corresponding share. Thus,
HTLPs are more efficient by a linear factor of n, where n corresponds to the
number of players participating in the reconstruction phase.
It is important that the homomorphic property of the HTLP scheme satisfies
the definition of compactness in [31] (found in the full version of this paper [24],
9 In a standard TLP scheme, the computational complexity of the puzzle-solving al-
gorithm P.Solve is the same as HP.Solve.
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Appendix A.2, Definition 9). This means that the runtime of homomorphically
evaluating puzzles, is bounded above by a fixed polynomial that only depends
on the security parameter λ and not the time hardness parameter T . Otherwise,
the trivial solution would be indeed to use a standard TLP scheme.
Comparison with [10] Our scheme closely follows the work of [10]. Their con-
struction involves linearly evaluating sub-shares encrypted using memory-bound
functions for the time-delay to ensure fairness of the scheme and reconstructing
the secret using Shamir’s SS scheme. In contrast, our generic construction uses
CPU-bound HTLPs to ensure a time-delay in rounds of the scheme, which we
have argued in the Introduction constitutes an improvement.
Furthermore, the construction of [10] requires players to independently de-
crypt each share before they proceed to the secret reconstruction using Shamir
SS scheme. The advantage of using HTLPs is that they provide an efficiency
improvement for the honest players evaluating puzzles in comparison to using
standard TLPs. Therefore our contributions are the efficiency improvements for
honest players in homomorphically evaluating puzzles.
Finally, we have generalised our construction so that it can be adapted for
different applications. The HTLP schemes of [31] are flexible in using different
homomorphic operations and can be extended to using puzzles with varying lev-
els of hardness (different T values), with potential for public-coin setup schemes
and reusable setup schemes. Unlike [10] who provide a concrete scheme, our
construction is generic and adaptable to the application for which it is being
used.
3.2 A Concrete Instantiation
Our final contribution is to provide a concrete fair and sound RSS scheme by
instantiating our construction with a specific variant of Shamir’s SS scheme
and a multiplicative HTLP (MHTLP [31]). In more detail, we instantiate our
construction as follows:
– A multiplicative homomorphic threshold secret sharing scheme
(Setup,Share,Recon) (Appendix B of [24]), for a secret space Sλ over a finite
group with respect to multiplication, defined as in [40,13,11],
– A MHTLP scheme (MHP.Setup,MHP.Gen,MHP.Eval,MHP.Solve) (in [24],
Appendix B), which is multiplicatively homomorphic over a ring (JN , ·).
The multiplicative operator ⊗ enables the dealer to split the ith share, for some
i ∈ [m], of the secret into n sub-shares in the following way,
si,n = si ·
(
n−1∏
j=1
si,j
)−1
,
enabling players to homomorphically evaluate sub-puzzles by running MHP.Eval,
and MHP.Solve on the master puzzle output from evaluation to obtain the cor-
rectly reconstructed share for the ith round. To ensure soundness of the con-
crete instantiation, the dealer distributes a checking share s0 to all players.
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This is computed as s0 = f(y0) (mod N), for some polynomial f determined
in the setup phase of the scheme from a multiplicative homomorphic threshold
SS scheme.
Whilst we have not implemented the concrete instantiation here, we note the
following: firstly, the inclusion of a MHTLP scheme to a secret sharing scheme
does increase the computational burden on the players participating in recon-
struction, however it provides the important property of fairness in our scheme
when soundness is additionally being provided by the means of side information.
Secondly, we use a multiplicative-homomorphic TLP rather than a standard TLP
in order to reduce the computational overhead for players by a linear factor. In-
deed, in the instantiation, one run of MHP.Eval is necessary, which translates
to n multiplications. This is followed by one run of MHP.Solve of complexity
Ω(2T ). If we used a plain TLP in the instantiation instead, assuming the same
parameters, we require n runs of HP.Solve of complexity Ω(2T ), followed by n
runs of HP.Eval, which means n multiplications.
In addition to the assumptions used in the security analysis of our generic
construction, the instantiation relies on standard cryptographic and number-
theoretical assumptions, including the sequential squaring and decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumptions for a MHTLP [31], found in Appendix A.2 of [24]. We defer
to [24] (Appendix C) for a full description of the instantiation of our construction.
Final remarks In this paper we have proposed a construction for a fair and
sound rational secret sharing scheme in the non-simultaneous setting of com-
munication from homomorphic time-lock puzzles. We have argued the benefits
of this novel approach, and we have suggested a concrete scheme, relying on
standard assumptions.
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